The Legal Intelligencer Blog

Does a Child-Support Obligation Terminate at Death?

By James W. Cushing
Special to the Legal

Lawyers and laypeople alike know at least the basics regarding child support. Most people know that someone who has his or her child most of the time is entitled to child support from the other parent and someone who has his or her child partially needs to pay child support to the other parent. There are two strains of law regarding child support. The first, as established by the Pennsylvania Legislature, makes it clear that every parent has an essentially absolute duty to support his or her child regardless of whether there is a formal child-support order entered by the court. The second is what most people think of when it comes to the law: One parent formally files for child support in court, a hearing or conference is held and an enforceable court order of support is entered. While this makes sense with living parents, what happens when the parent ordered to pay support, the “obligor,” dies?

It seems pretty clear that child support terminates at the time of the obligor’s death, but what happens when the obligor disinherits his or her minor children, so not only is the child-support obligation terminated, but the obligor’s estate cuts out the child as well? The court has looked into this sort of matter.

Surviving obligees (the parents who receive support) have argued that just because the obligor dies, their own responsibilities do not, and neither do the needs of their children in need of support. Indeed, they have argued that there is, as a result, an inherent injustice and inequity if the support is potentially available in the obligor’s estate but not directed to his or her minor children or, even worse, to some minor children but not others. Pennsylvania courts have expressed sympathy for these arguments raised by obligees; in fact, the court has described these arguments as alluring. Obligees have tried to take advantage of the court’s apparent sympathy for them by presenting other states’ laws that have allowed post-mortem child support.

Unfortunately for obligees, the sympathy of Pennsylvania courts only went so far. The courts have pointed out that while some states allow after-death support, the vast majority have not. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the courts have thus far been unwilling to extend a child-support obligation from the living to the dead, mainly because they believe doing so encroaches upon the province of the legislature. Indeed, the courts have noted that these arguments have been around for nearly 20 years at this point and the legislature has yet to take action on them. Therefore, the courts have, so far, believed that stretching existing child-support law to the point of obligating the dead moves beyond the province of developing case law and into the realm of altering statutory law as a legislature. The only exception the courts seem to have allowed in this area is when a property settlement agreement or divorce decree specifically allows for child support after death.

For more information on the issues described above, the following cases and statutes may be of interest: Benson v. Patterson, 574 Pa. 346 (2003); Garney v. Estate of Hain, 439 Pa.Super. 42 (1995); Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521 (1992); Gross v. Oeler, 527 Pa. 532 (1991); Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa.Super. 523 (1985); 23 Pa.C.S. Section 4321.

James W. Cushing is an associate at the Law Office of Faye Riva Cohen P.C., research attorney for Legal Research Inc. and sits on the board of directors of the Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia. 

I Now Pronounce You Never Married

By James W. Cushing
Special to the Legal

Over the last few months, Montgomery County’s register of wills, D. Bruce Hanes, has made quite a name for himself in the local and national media by issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples because he personally believes that Pennsylvania’s definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, which is still the law in most of the United States, is “arbitrary and suspect.” Hanes’ actions do not take into account what these licenses will mean for any divorces that result from the same-sex marriage licenses he has issued.

Many will presume that these same-sex divorces will simply proceed like any other divorce would; however, there may be an alternate means to achieve the dissolution of these “marriages,” especially if you are, or represent, the person with the greatest amount of assets and/or income. First of all, as Pennsylvania law does not recognize same-sex marriage, courts have, thus far, been unwilling to grant same-sex divorces because to do so would be to tacitly recognize the underlying marriage. So, what does one do with this Montgomery County marriage license, especially if one, or both, of the parties in a same-sex marriage moves to a jurisdiction that does recognize their marriage?

No matter how one feels personally, emotionally, legally or any other way on the subject of same-sex marriage, the undeniable fact is that, as it stands now, Pennsylvania law defines marriage as “a civil contract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife.” Therefore, by the clear operation of the plain and black-letter law, two people of the same sex may not enter a relationship defined as marriage under Pennsylvania law, regardless of what Hanes does or thinks. So, the obvious legal question is this: Can a court legally divorce what is not legally a marriage?

The matter of the same-sex marriages described above is not the first time the courts have had to entertain the basic question of whether a marriage was legal to start with, let alone subject to divorce. In 2007, the York County Court of Common Pleas heard the matter of Heyer v. Hollerbush, Pennsylvania No.: 2007-SU-2132-Y08 (September 7, 2007). In Heyer, the couple at issue (a man and a woman) was married with a Universal Life Church minister as the officiant. Under longstanding Pennsylvania law, only “the following are authorized to solemnize marriage between persons that produce a marriage license issued in this part: A minister, priest or rabbi of any regularly established church or congregation.” Armed with this statute, the plaintiff in Heyer, instead of filing for divorce, rather shrewdly and astutely, filed a motion for declaratory judgment instead, arguing that the couple had never actually been married because their Universal Life Church officiant had no authority to solemnize their marriage. The Heyer court agreed and ruled that since, in its estimation, a Universal Life Church minister does not fit the criterion laid out under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §1503(a)(6), the parties were never married. It is worth noting that in 2008, test cases with similar fact patterns as Heyer were filed in Philadelphia, Bucks and Montgomery counties and all resulted in rulings opposite to that of Heyer; however, as none of these matters reached the appellate level, there remains a split among the common pleas courts on this matter.

The impact of Heyer is enormous in the context of divorce, especially if one is, or represents, a defendant. The property held by one party, in the context of a divorce, is considered “marital” and therefore divisible if the parties were married. Furthermore, the dependent spouse may be entitled to spousal support, alimony pendente lite and/or alimony. If the parties were never married, property held in one name only is not divisible if the parties elect to dissolve their relationship and there is no right to any of the above-listed support. The “married” couple in Heyer turned out to be nothing more than a glorified dating, cohabitating or roommate relationship, with only basic contractual rights applying.

How is the Heyer case relevant to same-sex marriage and Hanes taking the law into his own hands? Similar to the parties in Heyer, the same-sex couples, despite the marriage licenses issued to them, are not actually married because of the basic application of Pennsylvania law. Therefore, if and when a party to a same-sex marriage wants to dissolve the relationship, one legal procedural route that is available is to file a motion for declaratory judgment instead of filing for divorce. As stated above, this avenue would be especially attractive to the party holding most of the assets and/or income. As there is already precedent for this tactic’s success, it would not be at all surprising to see it become more common as more same-sex couples are married contrary to the black letter of Pennsylvania law. Indeed, as Pennsylvania law does not recognize same-sex marriage, it does not, by definition, recognize same-sex divorce; therefore, a motion for declaratory judgment may be the only way to secure the striking and/or withdrawal of a same-sex marriage license.

In light of the above, there may be at least two ways to avoid a motion for declaratory judgment. First, if the Pennsylvania Legislature is able to change the historic definition of marriage, it could also, simultaneously, declare Montgomery County’s same-sex marriage licenses (and others like them) to be valid. Second, and more practically, same-sex couples who receive a marriage license such as those distributed by Hanes could simply enter into a nuptial agreement, laying out the terms and conditions of their relationship and their respective rights if their relationship dissolves; such an agreement is enforceable just as any other contract is enforceable. In the meantime, any same-sex couple that gets married using one of Hanes’ marriage licenses should do so with trepidation and with their eyes wide open to acknowledge that their marriage may be anything but a marriage if it does not work out in the future.

James W. Cushing is an associate at the Law Office of Faye Riva Cohen P.C., research attorney for Legal Research Inc. and sits on the board of directors of the Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia. 

Emancipation's Impact on Child Support

By James W. Cushing
Special to the Legal 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.17(a) establishes that a child support order will be modified as of the date the request for the modification is filed. This rule is consistent with the terms of 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4352 regarding retroactive modification of arrearages. Now, generally speaking, the modification of a child support order is requested because of a change in employment, a fluctuation of income, a change in the custodial arrangement of the children and the like. For the most part, the obligation to pay child support for a child terminates when the child reaches the age of 18, but is this termination automatic and, if not, can arrearages accrue after a child reaches the age of 18 if a petition to modify is not filed?

On its face, it would appear that if an obligor does not file to modify the child support – for the purpose of this article in order to terminate it because of emancipation – the order continues and arrearages can accrue after the age of 18.

Very few cases have been reported on the issues described above, and it would seem the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Holcomb v. Holcomb, 448 Pa.Super.154 (1995), is the leading case on the matter. In Holcomb, the child-at-issue graduated high school in June 1993, thereby becoming emancipated under the law. The father of the child did not file to modify the support order for the child, in order to terminate the order, until June 1994. The relevant question, for the purpose of this article, is whether the child support order should have continued to accrue between June 1993 and June 1994 despite the fact that the child for whom the support was ordered was emancipated the entire time.

The hearing officer’s reasoning was to give the father a retroactive accounting of his support back to June 1993, as if he filed his petition to modify in June 1993, effectively deciding that emancipation automatically takes effect regardless of filing to modify.

The court ruled that, first, it has no power or authority to require the obligee, the mother in this case, to repay any money received after the child-at-issue emancipates. It logically follows, then, that if it cannot order repayment, its power regarding reducing or eliminating arrearages is similarly absent.

Next, the court specifically ruled that it simply has no statutory or procedural warrant or authority to modify support arrearages before the date the father filed a petition to modify regardless of whether the child-at-issue for whom the support has been ordered is emancipated in the interim. Indeed, the court admonished the father, saying “nothing prevented [him] from filing a petition for modification on the date his daughter became emancipated … [therefore] like all successful petitioners who seek modification of a support order, the modification is granted effective as of the date the petition was filed.”

So, for obligors and practitioners alike, it is vitally important to be vigilant in filing petitions to modify support as soon as a child is emancipated; otherwise, a child support order, along with its arrearages, will potentially continue to accrue unabated until some action is taken to stop it.

James W. Cushing is an associate at the Law Office of Faye Riva Cohen P.C., research attorney for Legal Research Inc. and sits on the board of directors of the Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia.

Fresh Ink: Inside Today's Legal and Pa. Law Weekly

Welcome to your Tuesday morning round-up of stories in today’s edition of The Legal Intelligencer, which also includes this week’s edition of Pennsylvania Law Weekly. All of the links below will take you directly to today’s stories, or you can head straight over to The Legal’s homepage. (Some stories may require registration or a paid subscription.)

The top story in today’s Legal is a look at whether Pennsylvania is being forced to decide the Restatement issue it is facing. As reporter Amaris Elliott-Engel writes, after the Third Circuit said for the third time that the Restatement (Third) of Torts governs products liability cases in the state, some attorneys said the federal appeals court seems to be trying to force the issue.

Below the fold on Page 1, reporter Gina Passarella writes that employees of West Penn Allegheny Health System have been barred by collateral estoppel from filing a class action in state court when a Pittsburgh federal judge already ruled against certifying a collective action in a similar suit by the same plaintiffs.

In more Regional News on Page 3, reporter Saranac Hale Spencer writes that key claims against Prevacid, a heartburn drug, have survived in a federal lawsuit.

As always, our People in the News section is on Page 2, and the top stories from our sibling publications across the country make up the Page 4 National News section.

In a Health Care Law column, Vasilios J. Kalogredis and Karilynn Bayus write that hospitals are beginning to feel the effects of quality initiatives.

In a Supreme Court column on Page 7, Stephen A. Miller and Thomas M. O’Rourke write a look into the effect of the ¬Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes case and expansion of “rigorous” review.

Today’s lead story in PLW is a look at campaign fundraising in the attorney general race. As reporter Ben Present writes, Kathleen Kane has bolstered her coffers, narrowly outpacing David Freed.

Below the fold on Page 1, Ben Present writes that a Commonwealth Court en banc panel allowed General Motors to unilaterally suspend an injured worker’s benefits without the required paperwork because the man had taken a voluntary retirement package.

On Page 3, reporter Zack Needles writes that the Superior Court has blocked the discovery of past surgical notes in a medical malpractice suit.

There’s much more inside this week’s PLW, including Samuel C. Stretton’s Ethics Forum, in which he writes about violating attorney-client privilege when a client’s financial situation changes; Caren E. Morrissey’s Family Law column in which she writes that mental health records should be discoverable in custody matters; and Peter J. Bietz’s Trusts and Estates column, in which he writes that attorneys may need to change their practices after the EGTRRA’s sunset.

If you have questions or comments about any of today's stories, or our coverage as a whole, we invite you to e-mail any of the reporters directly. We hope you'll enjoy today's Legal.

Fresh Ink: Inside Today's Legal

Welcome to your Friday morning round-up of stories in today’s edition of The Legal Intelligencer. All of the links below will take you directly to today’s stories, or you can head straight over to The Legal’s homepage. (Some stories may require registration or a paid subscription.)

The top story this morning is the Third Circuit restating its prediction that the Restatement (Third) of Torts, not the Restatement (Second), will be adopted in Pennsylvania by the state Supreme Court. As reporter Amaris Elliott-Engel writes, some district courts have said the Restatement (Second) should apply because the high court has not affirmatively adopted the Restatement (Third).

Also above the fold on Page 1, reporter Ben Present writes that Jerry Sandusky filed post-sentence motions arguing the judge presiding over his trial denied him due process by failing to grant him several motions for a continuance before his June trial.

Below the fold on Page 1, reporter Gina Passarella writes that the state Supreme Court has ruled that the state’s Coroner’s Act does not give a county coroner the discretion to deny a request for immediate disclosure of someone’s manner of death.

In more Regional News on Page 3, a former Dechert associate’s retaliation claim has been allowed to proceed in a case alleging the firm’s “macho culture” caused his work troubles.

As always, our People in the News section is on Page 2, and the top stories from our sister publications across the country make up the Page 4 National News section.

In a Family Law column on Page 5, James W. Cushing writes that substantial evidence must be used to convince the court in child abuse cases based on a recent case that profoundly changed the burden of proof to have someone listed on the ChildLine and Abuse Registry as a perpetrator of child abuse.

In a Bankruptcy Update on Page 7, Eric Scherling writes that the Third Circuit has protected post-confirmation appeals in the case of In re Philadelphia Newspapers.

If you have questions or comments about any of today's stories, or our coverage as a whole, we invite you to email any of the reporters directly. We hope you'll enjoy today's Legal.

Fresh Ink: Inside Today's Legal and Pa. Law Weekly

Welcome to your Tuesday morning round-up of stories in today’s edition of The Legal Intelligencer, which also includes this week’s edition of Pennsylvania Law Weekly. All of the links below will take you directly to today’s stories, or you can head straight over to The Legal’s homepage. (Some stories may require registration or a paid subscription.)

Also inside of today’s paper is the latest Intellectual Property supplement, so be sure to give it a read.

The top story in today’s Legal is a look at the law surrounding third-party liability of law firms, which has recently been in the spotlight as appeals have been made to the Pennsylvania and U.S. Supreme Courts. As reporter Gina Passarella writes, law firms have been targeted as third-party defendants for their alleged roles in allowing fraudulent, or simply bad, business practices to continue by their clients.

Also on Page 1, reporter Saranac Hale Spencer writes that a lawsuit over the ownership of a LinkedIn profile is now set for trial after an Eastern District judge dismissed all of the federal claims and decided to proceed on the remaining claims under state law.

In more Regional News on Page 3, reporter Zack Needles writes that an orthopedic surgeon who won a $392,000 verdict against the law firm that used what he claimed was an unfinished expert report and the medical professional organization that subsequently suspended him has sued the doctors’ association for refusing to remove from its website an article detailing the suspension proceedings.

As always, our People in the News section is on Page 2, and the top stories from our sibling publications across the country make up the Page 4 National News section.

In an Appellate Law column on Page 5, Howard J. Bashman praises the Superior Court’s increased access to opinions after a recently policy change announcement.

In a Family Law column on Page 7, Michael E. Bertin writes about a recent case in which the Superior Court analyzed relocation under the new custody statute.

Today’s lead story in PLW is the state Superior Court ruling that state law does not allow for underinsured motorist recovery to offset an award against a third-party tortfeasor. As reporter Ben Present writes, the holding overrules the court’s decision in Pusl v. Means.

Below the fold on Page 1, Zack Needles writes that the state Supreme Court has ruled that general practitioners are not barred from consensual sex with patients in a case of first impression regarding a GP who was providing “incidental mental health treatment” to a patient.

On Page 3, Ben Present writes that the state Superior Court has imposed corporate liability on nursing homes in a recent decision.

There’s much more inside this week’s PLW, including Samuel C. Stretton’s Ethics Forum, in which he writes about nonrefundable fee clauses; Daniel J. Siegel’s Legal Ethics column on proposed changes to the rules affecting legal advertising; and Daniel E. Cummins’ Politics column on where the presidential candidates stand on tort reform and judicial selection.

If you have questions or comments about any of today's stories, or our coverage as a whole, we invite you to e-mail any of the reporters directly. We hope you'll enjoy today's Legal.

The Pros and Cons of a Cut-Rate Divorce

By James W. Cushing
Special to the Legal

I am sure you have seen billboard or newspaper advertisements that read something like “$250 Divorce!” or “Divorce Only $350!” Usually, the prices indicated are less than $500; indeed they are so low that they are less than the typical lawyer’s hourly rate for one hour of work, let alone a proper full retainer. How can these rates be so low for this sort of work? Clearly there has to be a catch.

Like most unbelievable deals, the cheap rates do come with a catch, but for some people it may be a risk worth taking. The key to one of these low-cost divorces is that they require filing in a distant Pennsylvania county, usually where neither party resides - Potter County, for example - and a guarantee that there will be no resistance from the opposing spouse or any sort of property division.

The reason for filing in places like Potter County is that the total court fees and costs for a divorce are $69. This is in contrast to the court fees and costs for a divorce, in Philadelphia, which currently are $316 for the complaint and $66 for the praecipe to transmit, plus other fees required for motions and/or seeking equitable distribution, etc. So, right off the bat, there is more than a $300 savings in court costs and fees alone. It should be noted that the opposing party must stipulate to the jurisdiction of a foreign county over the divorce or else the entire endeavor to file the divorce in that county is a non-starter.

The reason for restricting these divorces to matters where there is complete cooperation and no property division is because, perhaps obviously, fees begin to add up when the parties start bickering over various things or need to seek some sort of property division, whether by agreement or order of court. As soon as either one of the above begins to occur, the low rate is immediately untenable for the lawyer representing one of the parties. If the parties are completely cooperative without any sort of property division, litigating the divorce only involves preparing some form documents and filing them at the correct times and in the correct order. Obviously, litigating in this fashion will take very little time or effort on the attorney’s part, which justifies taking the case at such an extremely reduced rate.

So, from the client’s point of view, there is a risk or tradeoff. On one hand, filing in your local county is more expensive, but if something goes wrong you have the security of being able to litigate the issues conveniently and locally without having to withdraw your complaint and start afresh elsewhere. On the other hand, filing in a different county is very cheap and easy, but if something goes wrong, the cost to litigate in a very distant county likely becomes prohibitively expensive and extremely inconvenient. Either way, you will have to withdraw your complaint in the foreign county and file a new complaint in your own county, potentially wasting the time and money that was spent filing elsewhere.

Both of the above options are viable and legitimate; it just depends on whether the circumstances suggest one over the other. Ultimately, the decision of where and how to proceed lies with the client as long as he or she is fully aware of the pros and cons, and costs and benefits, of each of the options described above.

James W. Cushing is an associate at the Law Office of Faye Riva Cohen and research attorney for Legal Research Inc. He is licensed to practice law in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Fresh Ink: Inside Today's Legal and Pa. Law Weekly

Welcome to your Tuesday morning round-up of stories in today’s edition of The Legal Intelligencer, which also includes this week’s edition of Pennsylvania Law Weekly. All of the links below will take you directly to today’s stories, or you can head straight over to The Legal’s homepage. (Some stories may require registration or a paid subscription.)

This year’s Lawyers on the Fast Track supplement is also inside today’s paper, so be sure to give it a read.

The top story in today’s Legal is a preview of the return of the voter ID case to Commonwealth Court. As reporter Saranac Hale Spencer writes, the case is back in the hands of Judge Robert Simpson after the state Supreme Court remanded it to assess the actual availability of photo ID cards to Pennsylvania voters.

Also above the fold on Page 1, reporter Gina Passarella writes that a products liability trial alleging Johnson & Johnson illegally marketed the antipsychotic drug Risperdal for use by kid has opened in Philadelphia.

Below the fold on Page 1, reporter Zack Needles writes that Reed Smith has formed a strategic alliance with an Athens, Greece-based business law firm, Papapolitis & Papapolitis.

Also below the fold on Page 1, Saranac Hale Spencer writes that attorney Charles Naselsky was convicted Monday on charges related to a tax evasion scheme carried on while he worked as a real estate lawyer at Cozen O’Connor.

In a From the Chief column on Page 3, Hank Grezlak writes that the voter ID decision was one of the state Supreme Court’s finer moments.

As always, our People in the News section is on Page 2, and the top stories from our sibling publications across the country make up the Page 4 National News section.

In a U.S. Supreme Court column on Page 5, Stephen A. Miller writes the first in a two-part preview of the upcoming term.

In a Guest Commentary on Page 7, Robert L. Byer writes in a response to an editorial board column that possible split decisions are not related to party affiliation in the Supreme Court.

Today’s lead story in PLW is the Supreme Court vacating the reinstatement of a worker who was fired for sexually harassing his colleague. As reporter Ben Present writes, one lawyer involved in the case said it may mark the first time the high court has applied a public policy exception in vacating an arbitration award.

Below the fold on Page 1, Zack Needles writes that the Pennsylvania legal community might be becoming less forgiving of the disbarred.

On Page 3, Ben Present writes that a Superior Court panel declined to force a father to release his mental health records in a custody trial.

There’s much more inside this week’s PLW, including Samuel C. Stretton’s Ethics Forum, in which he writes that criticizing opposing counsel is a big mistake; Sean P. McCusker’s Family Law column on child support when a parent’s role is greatly diminished; and Cliff Rieders’ Politics column on the Supreme Court after Sebelius.

If you have questions or comments about any of today's stories, or our coverage as a whole, we invite you to e-mail any of the reporters directly. We hope you'll enjoy today's Legal.

Fresh Ink: Inside Today's Legal and Pa. Law Weekly

Welcome to your Tuesday morning round-up of stories in today’s edition of The Legal Intelligencer, which also includes this week’s edition of Pennsylvania Law Weekly. All of the links below will take you directly to today’s stories, or you can head straight over to The Legal’s homepage. (Some stories may require registration or a paid subscription.)

The Family Law supplement is also inside today's paper, so be sure to give that a read.

The top story in today’s Legal is the Third Circuit taking a skeptical view of reverse-payment settlements in a pharmaceutical patent case, rejecting the scope-of-the-patent test used by several other circuits to determine whether a settlement violates antitrust laws. As reporter Gina Passarella writes, the Third Circuit has instead adopted a rule-of-reason analysis to determine if the settlements warrant antitrust review.

Also above the fold on Page 1, reporter Zack Needles writes that Pittsburgh-based Tucker Arensberg has defeated a legal malpractice claim.

Below the fold on Page 1, reporter Saranac Hale Spencer writes that a judge has denied a doctor a new trial in a case of test question theft.

In more Regional News on Page 3, Hank Grezlak writes in a From the Chief column that the Freeh Report is a case study in how people rationalize ignoring evil.

As always, our People in the News section is on Page 2, and the top stories from our sibling publications across the country make up the Page 4 National News section.

In a Securities Law column on Page 5, Robert L. Hickok and Gay Parks Rainville writes that the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case regarding the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption.

In an Asset Management column on Page 7, Irvin G. Schorsch III writes about going beyond a lawyer’s fiduciary role in estate planning.

Today’s lead story in PLW is Lackawanna County outspending other counties on guardian ad litem services. Reporter Zack Needles writes that the county’s full-time guardian ad litem, Danielle M. Ross, made about $110,000 per year between 2009 and 2011.

Below the fold on Page 1, reporter Ben Present writes that cross motions for Facebook discovery were denied in an auto case.

On Page 3, Ben Present writes that the Superior Court has affirmed a $7.8 million verdict against Consol Energy.

There’s much more inside this week’s PLW, including Samuel C. Stretton’s Ethics Forum, in which he writes about ex parte communications with a judge; Daniel E. Cummins’ Civil Practice column on Medicare liens and personal injury matters; and Jeff Jubelirer’s Public Relations column on what to say when you can’t really say anything.

If you have questions or comments about any of today's stories, or our coverage as a whole, we invite you to e-mail any of the reporters directly. We hope you'll enjoy today's Legal.

Fresh Ink: Inside Today's Legal and Pa. Law Weekly

Welcome to your Tuesday morning round-up of stories in today’s edition of The Legal Intelligencer, which also includes this week’s edition of Pennsylvania Law Weekly. All of the links below will take you directly to today’s stories, or you can head straight over to The Legal’s homepage. (Some stories may require registration or a paid subscription.)

The top story in today’s Legal is a look at the Pennsylvania Am Law 200 firms’ 10-year results. Reporter Gina Passarella compares the numbers from the Am Law 200 in 2003 to those from 2012, noting that the gap between those toward the top and the rest of the list has widened over the past decade.

Below the fold on Page 1, reporters Zack Needles and Ben Present write that lawyers and litigants are taking issue with the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts’ guardian ad litem report, which found “no evidence” that the Lackawanna County guardian ad litem had been billing hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigants.

Also below the fold on Page 1, reporter Saranac Hale Spencer writes that a federal judge has extended attorney-client privilege to a third-party contractor who worked closely with a company.

In more Regional News on Page 3, Ben Present writes that the Superior Court has created a webpage for filings in cases of public interest, spurred on by the sex-abuse trial of Jerry Sandusky.

As always, our People in the News section is on Page 2, and the top stories from our sibling publications across the country make up the Page 4 National News section.

In an Eastern District column on Page 5, Peter F. Vaira writes about the do’s and don’ts of proposed findings and conclusions.

In a Commentary on Page 7, Jordan Furlong writes that most large firms today are overlawyered.

Today’s lead story in PLW is the Supreme Court granting allocatur in a Tender Years Act sex-abuse case. As Ben Present writes, the issue is whether a young girl’s out-of-court statements were properly admitted in her father’s child rape case when the girl had previously been determined incompetent to testify.

Below the fold on Page 1, reporter Amaris Elliott-Engel writes about the latest attempt in Harrisburg to reduce the state prison population by changing criminal law.

On Page 3, Ben Present writes that an arbitration clause between two companies has been ruled a nonfactor in a lawsuit against a CEO.

There’s much more inside this week’s PLW, including Samuel C. Stretton’s Ethics Forum, in which he writes about “black robe disease”; Matthew T. Mangino’s Criminal Practice column on the Supreme Court striking mandatory life sentences for juveniles; and Carolyn R. Mirabile’s Family Law column on what happens when a spouse dies during a divorce.

If you have questions or comments about any of today's stories, or our coverage as a whole, we invite you to e-mail any of the reporters directly. We hope you'll enjoy today's Legal.